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Abstract
Using CPS-MORG data for the years 1990-999,1 conduct a two-part study on the effects of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) on women’s labor market and earnings. Using a quasi-difference-indifference 
model, I first study the relationship between the EITC and the female labor supply and then examine the 
effect of EITC on gender wage gap. I find that a $1000 increase in the maximum EITC credit offered in 
the female labor market leads to a 6-percentage point increase in the employment rate. For the gender 
wage gap study, I find no significant results showing that the EITC impacts wage gap in any particular 
direction.
Introduction
Over the past few decades, women have made phenomenal advancements in social, political, and 
economic arenas. Higher education achievements, along with the improved ability to control their 
fertility, have allowed women to establish their economic independence. Despite these strides, women 
face systemic discrimination and disadvantages in the labor market. Although it is closing, the persistence 
of the gender wage gap indicates an enduring rigidity in societal norms and attitudes, which in turn 
influences the labor market. Public policies could be instrumental in identifying and correcting for the 
wage gap, to illicit equitable economic outcomes.
This paper attempts to study the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) policy and its effects on 
women’s labor supply and pay gap. While not explicitly created to help women in the labor market, the 
structure of the EITC benefits women more than men by supplementing the earned income of parents. 
Since the gendered expectation of child-care falls on women, they are more likely to be single parents and 
receive the EITC. Under the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93), the EITC became 
substantially more generous to households with children, creating, the incentive to participate in the labor 
market and generating inequality between workers with children and workers without children. Part I 
provides a literature review and the conceptual framework of this paper. It describes EITC’s history and
structure, the gender wage gap. and how EITC is related to women's labor supply and wage gap. Part II 
presents the data used in this study and describes some of variables I use in this paper. My analysis on 
EITC and women's labor supply begins in Part IV with the methodology and results from my study. I 
then move on to Part V. where I discuss my EITC and wage gap study, including the methodology and 
results. Finally, in Part VI. I provide conclusions of my findings and recommendations for future work in 
this area.
Part I: EITC and Gender Waee Gap
History and Structure of EITC
In 1975, President Ford's administration launched the EITC as a temporary refundable tax credit to offset 
Social Security tax paid by low-income workers with children (National Low Income Housing Coalition 
2014). After becoming permanent in 1978. it went through modifications and expansions under both 
Democratic and Republican leadership (Hotz and Scholz 2001). The key reason for such bipartisan 
support for this anti-poverty program is that it specifically aims to reward working families with 
children-a politically important segment of the population. As a result, over the years, the EITC has 
become one of the largest anti-poverty programs in the U.S. with about $67 billion in credit going to 27 
million people in the tax year 2015 (IRS. 2017).
hi order to receive the EITC an individual must meet two important criteria. First, a taxpayer 
must have positive earned income for the tax year. Earned income includes, wages, salaries, tips, and 
taxable employee pay. along with business and farm self-employment income (IRS. 2016). Second, 
taxpayer's earned income and adjusted gross income must each be less than an amount set by the IRS. 
which varies each year. For example, in 1999 (the last year in this study), the maximum income that 
qualifies a taxpayer for the EITC with two or more children w as $30,580.
Furthermore, there are some other eligibility conditions that either do not apply to all individuals 
or have changed in the course of the years studied in this paper. Firstly, in order to receive the EITC prior
to 1994, a taxpayer had to claim a child. A qualifying child must meet three basic tests: relationship, 
residency, and age (IRS, 2017). A qualifying child could be the biological child, grandchild, stepchild, 
adopted child, or the foster child of the taxpayer (henceforth, I will refer to qualifying child (children) as 
simply, child (children) and workers without a qualifying child as childless workers). The child must be 
living with the taxpayer for more than half of the tax year. The child must also be under the age of 19 
(under 24 if full-time student) or permanently and totally disabled. Starting in 1994, a taxpayer could 
receive a modest amount of EITC even if she does not claim a child. However, the taxpayer must be 
between the ages of 25 and 65 years to receive the EITC without a child, and must also not be a 
dependent of another taxpayer (IRS, 2017). Lastly, it is important to note that during the period chosen for 
this study, 1990-1999, the marital status of the taxpayer did not influence the amount of EITC received. 
This policy did change in the year 2002, after which married couples filing jointly received a higher 
amount of credit based on their joint income, as compared to a single person with the same amount of 
individual income.
After meeting the eligibility criteria, a taxpayer receives her EITC based on the amount of earned 
income and number of children. EITC has a phase-in, constant, and phase-out income regions. A taxpayer 
in 1999 with two or more children receives the credit phased in at 40 percent rate over the first $9,540 of 
the income, leading to a maximum credit of $3,816. Between the incomes of $9,640 and $12,460 the 
taxpayers receive a constant credit-the maximum credit of $3,816. Starting from the income of $ 12,460 
to $30,580, the credit is phased out at 21.06 percent of the income. After reaching the maximum income 
of $30,580 (larger of earned income and the aggregate gross income is used to determine this), the 
taxpayer is not eligible to receive any EITC. Refer to Figure I for the EITC schedule for the year 1999.
The EITC went through a major expansion in 1993, under the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 
1993 (OBRA93). This expansion not only increased the amount of EITC available to workers with 
children, but it also introduced EITC for workers without children (Congressional Research Service, 
2014). However, as compared to the tax credit received by the workers who have children, those who do
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation: Ways and Means Committee, 2004
Figure 2: Maximum EITC Generosity, by Tax Year and Number of Children (1999 dollars)
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation; Ways and Means Committee, 2004
not, receive a modest amount. After OBRA93, workers with one child witnessed an increase in maximum 
EITC by $725 (in 1999 dollars), whereas workers with two or more children experienced an increase of 
$2,160. Childless workers were able to receive a maximum sum of $347 following the expansions. These 
varying levels of EITC generosity based on the number of children claimed by the worker forms the basis
of this paper. I use this differential treatment of workers to estimate the effects on female employment 
rate and gender wage gap. Refer to Figure II for the trend in EITC maximum credit generosity from 1990- 
1999.
Gender Wage Gap
The gender wage ratio for full-time workers is the proportion of average female wages to average 
male wages earned during full-time employment. This ratio helps understand the gender based pay gap, 
which shows the difference in women’s and men’s wages. In 2014, women who worked full-time year- 
round earned, on average, received 79% of men’s median annual earnings. Over the last 50 years, the 
ratio of women’s earnings has been steadily increasing, reducing this gender wage gap. However, this 
relatively steep increase in the wage ratio has plateaued somewhat since the 1990s (Blau and Kahn 2006).
Some key factors influencing the sender wage sap
Employment rate: Women’s participation in the labor market is significant in explaining the gender wage 
gap for two reasons. Firstly, a worker receives wages upon being employed; secondly, the longer, more 
continuous, attachment to the labor market means potentially higher wages for the worker. Over the years, 
women’s employment rate has increased, thanks to increasing female wages, higher education attainment, 
cultural and attitudinal shifts, and changes in public policy, amongst others (Blau and Kahn 2016; Cotter, 
Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001).
I will look at the effect of the EITC, as a public policy, on labor supply of single, head of 
household, females from 1990-1999 in Part III. An increase in labor supply owing to the EITC may 
indicate an increase in the female to male earnings ratio.
Education: Although, men tended to receive higher education at a greater rate than women, by 1980 
women’s college graduation rate was comparable to men’s. Eventually, women started earning more 
bachelor’s, associate, master’s, and PhD level degrees than men (Blau and Kahn 2016). Women’s 
increased investment in human capital formation has led them to increase their labor force attachment.
Additionally, being highly educated increases their chances of qualifying for higher-paying jobs. From 
both perspectives, we would expect the wage gap to be influenced by higher gains in education made by 
women. However, women are still underrepresented in STEM fields, which tends to be associated with 
higher wages, causing education-based gender gap to persist (Black, Haviland, Sanders and Taylor 2008)
Traditional Gender Roles and Motherhood: The expectation from women to fulfill traditional nonmarket 
labor influences both their employment rate and labor market attachment. “Motherhood penalty” 
documented by researchers like Korenman and Neumark (1992) and Waldfogel (1998) shows a negative 
relationship between women’s wages and the number of children.
Being a new mother often pulls women out of the workforce in the absence of strong maternity 
laws. If she returns to work, she may opt for a lower-paying flexible job, in order to fulfill duties at home 
Motherhood may also reduce women’s productivity as they balance between work and home, making 
some reluctant to being promoted to more demanding jobs. Due to this expectation and discriminatory 
perception, employers may be unwilling to invest training and or even hire women, especially of 
childbearing age (Blau and Kahn 2016; Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007).
EITC and Female Labor Supply
In the 1990s, the U.S. labor market witnessed an influx of women, mostly single mothers. Blank and 
Gelbach. 2006 theorizes that in addition to a strong booming economy in the 90’s, there are potentially 
four policy-related reasons for the changes in the female labor supply during this period:
1. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) state waivers
2. Introduction of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grants
3. Increase in the minimum wage and EITC expansions
4. Increase in child care subsidies and access to public health insurance (Medicaid)
Either through stricter work requirements and time-limits (AFDC state waivers and TANF block 
grants), growth in returns to work (higher minimum wage and EITC expansions), or reduction in gender-
based and other work-related costs (child care subsidies and public health insurance) these policies 
encouraged more participation from women in the labor market. Specifically, EITC expansions of 1993 
have been associated with increasing women’s labor supply (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and 
Rosenbaum 2001).
EITC adds positive supplemental income for every incremental amount of income received by a 
worker within the maximum income amount set each year. Ceteris paribus, increasing the amount of 
income received is related to increasing the labor market participation. Therefore, if a taxpayer has a 
preference for working before EITC policy was introduced, she will continue to work under the policy.
On the other hand, those who did not participate in the labor market are unaffected by EITC policy as 
they have no income to receive the credit for. However, due to the offer of an additional after-tax income 
under the EITC, some taxpayers may be encouraged to join the labor force, if they were not previously 
employed (Eissa and Liebman, 1996). Therefore, I expect EITC to induce labor supply of single women. I 
will examine this hypothesis in part III.
The three-phase structure of the EITC has varying effects on the intensive margin of labor supply 
due to income and substitution effects rendered by the schedule. For a worker in the phase-in range of the 
schedule, the decision to participate in the labor market is unclear since the substitution and income 
effects are working in opposite directions. Increasing hours of work will lead to additional income 
through the credit, causing the substitution effect to encourage the worker to substitute work for leisure, 
but the income effect to encourage reducing working hours. In the constant phase, the substitution effect 
is zero, as increasing working hours does not lead to additional credit. Therefore, only income effect is at 
work causing the taxpayer to reduce her working hours. Finally, in the phase-out region, the labor supply 
is unambiguously reduced as both the substitution and income effects are negative: while the credit 
earned is declining, it is still adding addition income to the total income earned. In this paper, I will not be 
studying the effects of EITC on number of hours worked, as I do not have appropriate data for this part.
However, Eissa and Liebman 1996, show that women already in the labor force do not reduce their hours 
of work under EITC.
EITC and Gender Wage Gap
The direction of the effect of EITC on gender wage gap is not very intuitive due to the structure 
and the effect of the policy. Since the amount of EITC received depends on the number of children a 
worker claims, we would expect that working women are more likely to claim the EITC as women are 
more likely to be single parents than men. Women are also more likely to be in lower income bracket, 
making them more eligible for the tax credit. In a way, EITC compensates single women for the 
motherhood penalty and improves their post-tax wages, potentially reducing the gender wage gap. 
However, married women, in the period of study, file jointly with spouses and receive the EITC for the 
filing unit as a whole. If the combined income of the married couple is over the income cutoff for the 
year, they do not receive the EITC. Therefore, if the married women could file as a single head of 
household, they would be able to claim the tax credit, improving their post-tax wages (Tax Foundation, 
2015). According to Eissa and Hoynes 2002, the marriage penalty caused by the structure of EITC 
induces a reduction in the total labor supply of married couples and, specifically, women tend to reduce 
their employment rate in order for the couple to receive the EITC. Therefore, the effects of EITC on the 
wage gap of married women are ambiguous.
For those women who were not already working, the incentive to work under EITC can lead to a 
reduction in wages for everyone in the labor market. The large labor supply of women, considering that 
men and women are not perfect substitutes and women tend to concentrate in particular occupations and 
industries, will drive down the wages of all women. Rothstein 2008, finds that it is the low skilled women 
without children who are hurt by the EITC policy as their wages go down, but they are not compensated 
by the EITC (not until 1994 and very moderately after). Based on his estimated demand elasticities and 
distribution of EITC-qualifying and not qualifying women across skill groups, a dollar of EITC spending 
allows single mothers to receive $0.70 of the benefits and the employers of low-skilled labor to capture
$0.72, with $0.42 coming from EITC ineligible workers. Single mothers’ after-tax income increases by 
$1.21 as the incomes of childless women falls by $0.73 as a result of supply shift and changes in wages. 
Therefore, the overall impact on women’s post-tax earnings, compared to men is unclear. In this paper, I 
will try to shed some light on this ambiguity.
Part II: Data
I use CPS-MORG data from IPUMS-CPS for the years 1990-1999. The CPS data contain 
monthly information about the labor market and income of households and individuals, in addition to 
gender, number of children present, education attainment, age, race, and marital status. CPS-MORG 
includes information on usual hours worked per week and earnings of individuals. For both studies, I use 
the hourly earnings and the usual hours worked per week as the measure of wage, and employment rate 
variable as the measure labor supply. Employment rate variable is a binary variable where the value one is 
assigned to those who indicated being employed in the last week and zero assigned to those who were not 
employed last week. I calculate the total annual income of the individuals using their hourly wages, usual 
hours worked per week and an estimated number of weeks worked by all individual1 (I used 40 weeks as 
a proxy for usual number of weeks worked since I did not have enough data on this). The individuals in 
the study may have either positive or zero hours of work and earned income.
In both studies, the sample is restricted to single heads of household (never married or widowed) 
who were between the ages of 25-65 if they did not have a child or between the ages of 15-65 if they did.
I divide the individuals in my sample by education groups (less-than high school, high school, and college 
and more) and by age group (15-24, 25-40, 41-65). I identify a dependent in atax-filing unit as “child” if 
she/he was under the age of 19. I did not have sufficient information to check the six-months residency 
status of the child or to identify full-time students under 24, therefore any dependent over 19 was not
1I lose some variation due to the different number o f  weeks worked by different individuals but the variation from hourly earnings and usual 
hours worked per week can provide reasonable estimation.
considered qualifying. Furthermore, I exclude those serving in the military. In total, there are 125,453 
men and 155,264 women in the sample.
I created two EITC variables in both studies. First, I created an EITC generosity variable, which 
is based on the maximum credit allowed to an individual depending on the number of children and year. 
Second, I created an predicted EITC variable to calculate the approximate EITC individuals would 
receive based on their income, number of children, and year. I use this variable to estimate total post- 
EITC earnings by adding it to the total annual income variable. I procured this information from the 
Congressional Research Service. All the wages, earnings, and tax credit amounts were calculated in 2016 
dollars.
Part III: Effect of EITC on Female Labor Supply
Methodology
To study the effect of EITC on the female labor supply, I used the data on women from my 
original sample. Table I shows the summary statistics of the characteristics for this group. Between 
women with and without children, there are some considerable differences. Women with children tend to 
be younger (34.82 vs. 46.57 years), less educated (12.53 vs. 13.42 years), and less likely to be employed in 
the previous week (0.74 vs. 0.77). Moreover, women with children also tend to earn lower hourly wages 
($13.47 vs. $16.29) and lower total annual income ($25,145.53 vs. $30,771.59). The number of children 
does not cause many remarkable differences in characteristics. However, women with one child are more 
likely to be employed than women with two or more children (0.71 vs. 0.61 for women with high school 
education). For all women with children, those with more years of education tend to have higher wages 
and employment rates.
Table II shows the differences in employment rate of childless women and women with children 
before and after the EITC expansion. It also shows the differences for the subset of women with children 
who are most likely to be impacted by the expansion: less educated (high school or less), which can
correspond to lower wages due to lower human capital, and non-white women (all other races except 
white). The first column shows the average employment rate for Pre-OBRA93 years (1990-1993) and the 
second column shows these averages for Post-OBRA93 years (1994-1999). While participation rates for 
all women increase post expansion, the jump is more significant for women with children (0.66 pre- 
OBRA32 vs. 0.70 post-OBRA93). The fact that there was little change in the participation rate of women 
without children can point to a lack of aggregate effect, since the expansions barely changed the tax credit 
received by childless workers. Furthermore, for less educated and non-white women with children, the 
change in participation rate was substantial as well.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the trends in employment rate of childless women, women with one 
child, and women with two or more children. The labor supply of childless women is almost constant, 
with a slight upward trend. However, for women with children the spike in participation after 1994 is very 
noticeable.
Table I: Summary statistics for all women in the sample, 1990-1999
Notes'. Data are from survey years 1990-1999 of the Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). The sample 
contains unmarried women between the ages o f  15 and 65. Employment rate equals one if  hours worked last week are positive, zero otherwise. 
Total annual income is calculated using hourly wages, usual hours worked per w eek and an approximation for number of w eeks worked in a year, 
40. All figures are in 2016 dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Number o f  observations is in square brackets.
Table II: Difference in key characteristics of women with and without children, before and after 
EITC expansions
Notes'. Data are from survey years 1990-1999 o f  the Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). Pre-OBRA93 
years are 1990-1993 and Post-OBRA93 years are 1994-1999. Employment rate equals one i f  number o f  hours worked last week is positive, zero 
otherwise. Total annual income is calculated using hourly wages, usual hours worked per week and an approximation for number o f  weeks 
worked in a year, 40. All figures are in 2016 dollars. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Figure 3: Employment Rate for Childless Workers
Tax Year
Figure 4: Employment Rate for Workers with One Child
Tax Year
Figure 5: Employment Rate for Workers with Two or More Children
Tax Year
Notes: Each figure plots the mean employment rate variable for each year (1990-1999) based on the number o f  children for single 
women heads o f  household. Employment rate equals one if  number o f  hours worked last week is positive, zero otherwise.
Regression Results
To estimate the effect of a $1000 increase in EITC generosity on female labor supply, I use the model: 
LFPit = p + 0max _E IT C/1000 + ipZ + kidsi + At + £jt 
Where, LFPit is the employment rate for individual i and tax year t. max_EITC/1000 is the maximum 
EITC credit an individual is eligible for, based on the number of children she has. I used an increase in 
$ 1000 for maximum EITC for the ease of interpretation of the results. Z  is demographic vector that 
includes the age, its square and cube, race dummy (non-white women are assigned value one and white 
women are assigned a value of zero), and years of education, kidsi is the number of children a woman 
has; this could take values between zero and two. Families with more than two children receive the same 
amount of EITC as families with two children during the period of the study. Finally, At is time fixed 
effects.
I run three sub-groups for this specification: for the entire sample, for high school and less-than 
high school educated women, and for non-white women. Table III shows the regression results for all 
women in the sample. Table IV shows the regression results for high school or less educated and non­
white women. This is a quasi-difference-in-difference model as the years pre and post-OBRA93 are 
captured in the year fixed effects and having children is the treatment. The maximum EITC credit
available to individuals based on their number of children can be considered an interaction term between
number of children and years, since maximum EITC available for workers with children post OBRA93 
was significantly more than the maximum EITC available to childless workers.
The first column only includes the EITC generosity variable, EITC/1000, while second through 
fourth columns include other covariates including race, years of education, and, age and its square and 
cube. The EITC generosity variable is significant in each specification. For model two—all women in the 
sample and additional covariates— a $1000 increase in EITC generosity increases the employment rate 
by about 6 percentage points. For less educated women and non-white women, the employment increases 
by 6.2 and 5.6 percentage points respectively when the maximum credit increases by a $1000.1 also 
found other covariates of race, education, and age to be significant—as compared to white women, non­
white women tend to participate less in the labor force; women with more years of education tend to 
participate more in the labor market, and; women continue to participate in the labor market as they age 
till a certain point after which they reduce their labor supply. My estimates are close to what the literature 
shows. Eissa and Liebman 1996, found a 2.8 percentage point increase in the employment rate of all 
single women in their sample for the years of 1984-1986 and 1988-1990.Their study looks at the effects 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which also included an expansion of the EITC. Similarly, Meyer and 
Rosenbaum 2001, studied factors contributing to the increase in the labor supply of single mothers and 
estimate that the EITC and other tax policy changes increased their weekly employment by 4.4 percentage 
points over their study period covering 1984-1996 period, where most of the increase was found to be 
during the 1992-1996 period. My slightly higher estimates for the employment rate can be explained by 
my chosen period of study (1990-1999), during which, according to Meyer and Rosenbaum, the labor 
supply increased the most.
Table III: Coefficients of models predicting the employment rates of all women, 1990-1999
Subgroups
Coefficient All women All women High school or less- Non-whites
Estimates (1) (2) than high school (4)
educated (3)
Without Covariates With Covariates With Covariates With Covariates
EITC/1000 0.042*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.057***
(0.00258) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0039)
Non-W hite — -0.044 *** -0.062*** —
(0.0025) (0.0040)
Years of Education — 0.032 *** 0.035*** 0.041***
(0.00039) (0.00079) (0.0008)
Age — 0.013*** 0.026*** 0.033***
(0.0031) (0.0044) (0.0059)
Age Squared — 0.00021** -0.00007 -0.00033*
(0.000076) (0.000109) (0.00015)
Age Cubed — -0.000007*** -0.0000048*** -0.000002*
(0.00000059) (0.000000085) (0.0000012)
N 137,527 137,572 71,223 41,881
R2 0.03 0.23 0.16 0.18
Notes'. Data are from survey years 1990-1999 ol' the Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). The dependent 
variable is employment rate. II equals one if  number o f  hours worked Iasi week is positive, zero otherwise. EITC, 1000 is the maximum EITC 
benefits individuals can receive, based on the number o f  children, divided by 1000 for Ihe ease o f  interpretation. Non-white equals one if  the 
woman is o f  a race other than white, zero otherwise. Columns (2) through (4) include variables for race, years o f  education, and age. All figures are 
in 2016 dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses. “*p 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p 0.001”
Moreover. I calculated the impact of a $ 1 ()()() increase in the EITC on various other key variables: 
total annual income, post-ElTC earnings, predicted EITC. usual hours worked per week and log of hourly 
wages. Tabic A in the appendix shows the complete results of these regressions. The EITC generosity 
variable is significant for all specifications except for the log of hourly wages. A $ 1000 increase in the 
EITC increases the total annual income by $302.40 for all women and increases the predicted EITC for all 
women by $906.93. The post-EITC earnings increase by $ 1,198 for all women as the maximum EITC 
increases by a $1000. Furthermore, the usual hours worked per week increase by 0.77 as the EITC 
maximum is increased by $1000. My calculations show the hourly w ages of all w omen in the sample 
decreases by 1.6% as the maximum EITC increases by a $1000. for the model without any other 
co variates.
Part IV: Effect of EITC on Gender Wage Gap
Methodology
To study the relationship between the EITC and gender wage gap, I use the CPS-MORG sample 
from 1990-1999 of all single (never married or widowed) heads of households. Table V shows the 
summary statistics of various characteristics for men and women based on their parental status (having 
children or not having children). As expected, women are more likely to be single parents (46,179 vs. 8, 
406). Additionally, women with children have a higher percentage of non-white individuals (51% vs. 
27%), have a lower employment rate (1.69 vs. 1.74), and tend to receive lower hourly wages ($12.64 vs. 
$15.96) as compared to men in their parental status group. Women without children fare similarly 
compared to men in their group.
In order to study specific labor markets to estimate the wage gap, I created the models based on 
education and age on aggregate levels. I created nine education-age markets based on three education 
levels (less-than high school, high school, and bachelor’s degree and beyond) and three age groups (15- 
24, 25-40, and 41-65). Tables VI and VII show summary statistics of employment rates, hourly wages, 
and post-EITC earnings in each education-age markets for men and women. Post-EITC earnings are 
calculated by summing total annual income and the predicted EITC received by individuals based on their 
income, number of children, and year. The difference in employment rates between men and women is 
the starkest in low-education levels. For example, in the less-than high school education level and age 
group 2, the participation rate is 0.87 for men vs. 0.56 for women, as opposed to the 0.95 rate for both 
men and women in the same age group, but bachelor’s degree and beyond education level. For hourly 
wages and post-EITC earnings, women lag behind men in every education-age market.
I computed average EITC received by individuals per state, to see state-based wage and EITC 
variation. States with lower hourly wages like Mississippi and Alabama have higher average EITC 
allocated to individuals, whereas states like New York, California, and Massachusetts have lower average
EITC, since EITC targets low-income individuals. I use these data to create a binary variable, High EITC1 
State, showing a "high” EITC level defined by an average predicted EITC of more than $330 ($330 was 
the average EITC received across the states). States with more than $330 of average predicted EITC are 
assigned a value of one, and zero otherwise. To check this classification, I ran two specifications: 
employment ratio and predicted EITC stratifying by high and low EITC states. Refer to Table B in the 
appendix. The high EITC states have a greater response to a $ 1000 increase in the maximum EITC than 
the low EITC states. This is expected as the labor markets within states with higher levels of predicted 
EITC are more impacted as a result of the policy. Next, for high EITC states, a $1000 increase in the 
maximum EITC increases the predicted EITC by a much higher amount ($733) than for low EITC states. 
We can expect that EITC added $733 to women's post-EITC earnings in states with high EITC. I found 
the average post-EITC earnings across all individuals to be $23,175. and so I expect the EITC to shrink 
the earnings gap by about 3% ($733/$23,175).
Table V: Summary statistics for all heads of household in the sample, 1990-1999
V ariab le With Children 
[54,225]
Without Children 
[226,492]
Male
[8,406]
Female
[46,179]
Male
[117,407]
Female
[109,085]
Age 33.73 33.71 34.82 41.05
(10.62) (10.54) (11.69) (15.00)
Share of Non-W hites 27% 51% 17% 20%
(0.45) (0.50) (0.38) (0.40)
Years Of Education 11.96 11.84 13.52 13.47
(2.73) (2.52) (2.94) (3.08)
Em ploym ent rate 0.89 0.62 0.86 0.76
(0.31) (0.49) (0.35) (0.43)
Hourly W age 15.96 12.64 16.52 15.06
(7.73) (6.93) (9.52) (8.75)
Total Annual Income 25,481.12 17,948.32 25,305.34 21,300.62
(13219.49) (10,287.73) (15097.75) (13,510.98)
Notes'. Data are from survey years 1990-1999 o f  the Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). The sample 
contains single men and women between the ages o f  15 and 65. I exclude people who are divorced. Employment rate equals one i f  hours worked
Iasi week are positive, zero otherwise. Total annual income is calculated using hourly wages, usual hours worked per week and an approximation 
for number o f  weeks worked in a year, 40. Standard deviations are in parentheses. All figures are in 201 (> dollars. Number o f  observations is in 
square brackets.
Table VI: Summary statistics for all males in the sample, 1990-1999
Variables Less-than High School 
[24,340]
High School 
[67,956]
Bachelor's Degree and Beyond 
[33,157]
Age Group 
1
[5,320]
Age Group
2
[10,506]
Age Group
3
[8,514]
Age Group 
1
[15,468]
Age Group 
2
[37,151]
Age Group
3
[15,337]
Age Group 
1
[2,956]
Age Group 
2
[21,176]
Age Group 
3
[9,025]
Em ploym ent 0.87 0.87 0.55 0.86 0.92 0.74 0.88 0.95 0.86
rate (0.34) (0.33) (0.50) (0.34) (0.27) (0.44) (0.33) (0.22) (0.34)
Hourly W age 11.85 14.97 15.98 12.26 17.22 19.19 14.72 21.96 24.30
(5.70) (7.32) (8.06) (5.52) (8.87) (9.49) (7.04) (13.75) (14.64)
Post-EITC 19,033.24 24,580.79 25,323.89 18,269.35 27,550.63 30,146.37 21,197.62 32,645.13 35,151.12
earnings (9191.3) (11968.5) (13685) (10060) (14190.1) (15883.7) (13012.7) (21699.6) (22281.9)
Notes'. Data are from survey years 1990-1999 ol' the Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). The sample 
contains single men between the ages o f  15 and 65. Age is divided into age groups 1 (15-24), 2 (25-40). and 3 (41-65). Employment rate equals 
one i f  hours worked Iasi week are positive, zero otherwise. Post-EITC earnings variable is calculated by summing up total annual income and 
EITC received. Total annual income is calculated using hourly wages, usual hours worked per week and an approximation for number o f weeks 
worked in a year. 40. Approximate amount o f  EITC claimed by individuals is computed by their income and number o f  children for each year, 
using Ihe EITC parameters from Joint Committee on Taxation; Ways and Means Committee, 2004. All figures are in 2016 dollars. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. Number o f  observations is in square brackets.
Table VII: Summary statistics for all females in the sample, 1990-1999
Variables Less-than High School 
[39,511]
High School 
[81,520]
Bachelor's Degree and Beyond 
[34,233]
Age Group 
1
[6,786]
Age Group 
2
[12,220]
Age Group
3
[20,505]
Age Group 
1
[17,014]
Age Group 
2
[34,280]
Age Group
3
[30,226]
Age Group 
1
[3,612]
Age Group
2
[19,077]
Age Group 
3
[11,544]
Em ploym ent 0.52 0.56 0.43 0.79 0.83 0.65 0.89 0.95 0.83
rate (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.41) (0.38) (0.48) (0.32) (0.23) (0.38)
Hourly W age 9.71 11.77 11.96 10.72 14.62 15.39 14.63 20.74 23.76
(4.07) (5.36) (5.27) (5.40) (7.89) (7.70) (7.03) (11.37) (12.95)
Post-EITC 14,616.70 19,255.25 17,672.80 14,961.06 23,015.44 22,673.05 20,503.03 29,865.09 32,493.03
earnings (6965.6) (9277.6) (9465.6) (8159.7) (11532.9) (12657.8) (11458.6) (17321.9) (19790.7)
Notes: Data are from survey years 1990-1999 o f  the Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). 'Ihe sample 
contains single women between the ages o f  15 and 65. Age is divided into age groups 1 (15-24). 2 (25-40). and 3 (41-65). Employment rate 
equals one if  hours worked last week are positive, zero otherwise. Post-EITC earnings variable is calculated by summing up total annual income 
and EITC received. Total annual income is calculated using hourly wages, usual hours worked per week and an approximation for number o f  
weeks worked in a year, 40. Approximate amount o f  EITC claimed by individuals is computed by their income and number o f  children for each 
year, using Ihe EITC parameters from Joint Committee on Taxation; Ways and Means Committee. 2004. All figures are in 2016 dollars. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. Number o f  observations is in square brackets.
In order to consider the effect of EITC expansions under OBRA93. I created a post93 dummy 
variable with a value of one referring to years after 1993 and a v alue of zero indicating years before 1994. 
Finally, to analyze the earnings gap. I study three kinds of earnings: total annual income. post-EITC
earnings, and hourly wages. I calculate the women to men earnings ratio for all three types of earnings. 
For this, I collapsed mean post-EITC earnings, total annual income, and hourly wages of men and women 
to cells defined by state, year, age group, and education groups in the sample. For every age-education 
group, I derived the ratios for three earnings types.
Regression Results
I use the following model to estimate the effects of Post-OBRA93 EITC expansion on post-EITC 
earnings ratio for each education-age group market
Yaest = « + (3Post93 + yHigh_EITC + SPost93tXHigh_EITCs + <ps + a>t + saest
Where Yaest is the earnings ratio (female/male post-EITC earnings) for age-group a, education level e, in 
state s, and tax year 1.1 include fixed effects for state <ps and year cot . Education levels are less-than high 
school, high school, and college, which includes bachelor’s degree or more. The age is divided into three 
groups: age group 1, 15-24; age group 2, 25-40; and age group 3, 41-65. States include all 50 states, plus 
District of Columbia. The range of years included are 1990-1999. All wages and earnings are calculated 
in 2016 dollars. Table VIII, IX, and X present the regression coefficients of three sets of regressions I ran 
based on education levels and age groups—log hourly wage gap, total annual income gap, and post-EITC 
earnings gap. Table VIII, IX, and X show the regression results for less-than high school high school, and 
bachelor’s degree and beyond education levels, respectively. These are robust standard errors, weighted 
regressions by the number of observations of men and women per each age-education group, by state and 
year.
While less than high school educated individuals in age group 3 witnessed a 12% increase in the 
female to male hourly wage ratio post-OBRA, for high school graduates in the age group 1 and 2, post- 
1993 years lead to a 9% and 10% decrease respectively in the hourly wages ratios compared to years 
before 1994. States with high levels of EITC allocated in the less-than high school-age group 1 and high 
school level-age group 2 markets are associated with higher annual income ratio than the states with
Table VIII: Coefficients of models predicting the log of hourly wage gap by education levels and 
age groups, 1990-1999
Table IX: Coefficients of models predicting the total annual income gap by education levels and age 
groups, 1990-1999
Table X: Coefficients of models predicting the post-EITC earnings gap by education levels and age 
groups, 1990-1999________________ ___________________________________________________
Less than high school education level High school education leve Bachelor's degree*- education level
Age Group Age Group Age Group Age Group Age Group Age Group Age Group Age Group Age Group
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Post93 0.14 0.06 0.11 -0.05 -0.07** -0.04 0.78 -0.19 -0.05
(0.15) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.43) (0.13) (0.30)
High EITC 0.19 0.12 -0.24 0.15 0.14* 0.05 -0.43 0.22 -0.92*
State (0.10) (0.07) (0.21) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.66) (0.22) (0.38)
Post93 x 0.05 0.01 0.19 -0.004 0.04 -0.02 0.15 -0.10 -0.19
High EITC 
State
(0.09) (0.04) (0.17) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.28) (0.08) (0.23)
N 401 427 403 510 510 500 258 469 319
R2 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.10
Notes'. Data are from survey years 1990-1999 o f  the Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). The
dependent variables are female to male, log o f  hourly wage ratio, total annual income ratio, and post-EITC earnings ratio for each education-age 
group market. I derive the mean female and male log ofhourly wage, total annual income, and post-EITC earnings for each education-age group 
by collapsing the data by state and year. Each column is a separate weighted regression with robust standard errors for each education-age 
market. Post93 is a dummy variable where years after 1993 are assigned a value o f  one and zero otherwise. High EITC State is a dummy variable, 
where a state with an average EITC value o f  over $330 is assigned a value o f  one, and zero otherwise. Post93 x High EITC is an interaction term 
between P 0x193 and High EITC State. All columns include state and year fixed effects. .All figures are in 2016 dollars. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. "*p 0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001”
lower amounts of EITC (22% and 13%). However, in the bachelor’s degree and beyond education and 
age group 3 market, the states with higher EITC are associated with reducing the annual income ratio by 
93% than states with lower EITC.
Finally, the post-EITC earnings ratio decreases by 7% post-OBRA as compared to 
years prior to 1994. The post-EITC earnings ratio increases by 14% for high school educated and age 
group 2 affiliated individuals in states with higher levels of EITC than in states with lower levels of EITC. 
Again as with the total annual income, in the bachelor’s degree and beyond educated and age group 3 
market, the states with higher EITC are associated with reducing the post-EITC earnings ratio by 92% 
than states with lower EITC. Being in a state with higher EITC, after OBRA93 does not significantly lead 
to a change in the earnings ratio. Only high school level and age group 2 market shows an increase in the 
earnings ratio of about 4% at a 10% significance level, as compared to the pre EITC expansions years in 
low EITC states. Therefore, in this sample, the EITC expansions did not significantly affect the gender 
earnings gap. However, for the expected shrinkage in the earnings gap I estimated in the methodology 
part of this section (about 3%), the confidence intervals for the post-EITC regressions do include this 
amount.
Part V: Conclusion and Remarks
While the EITC focuses on working families, it is the single women with children who tend to 
benefit considerably from the policy as they are more likely to be in the low-income range covered by the 
EITC and are more likely to be single parents than men. The EITC expansion of 1993 supplemented the 
earnings of EITC eligible households and increased the employment rate of women by 6 percentage 
points. Among women with high school and less than high school education, the impact was even greater 
-6 .2  percentage points- whereas for non-white women the impact was also significant, albeit less than 
that for all women in the sample (5.7 percentage points). The substantial increase in the maximum EITC 
awarded to eligible households, along with the more generous modified structure of the phase-in and
phase-out range, incentivized women with children to join the labor force. This stimulus to work, along 
with other factors discussed earlier, encouraged an influx of women in the labor market.
Even though I expected a change in the earnings gap between men and women due to the 
expansion in EITC, the results do not reflect a significant adjustment. The fact that in the high school 
educated-age group 2 market, the gap widened after the expansions, shows that there may be other factors 
influencing this movement. If, for this labor market, men increased their post-EITC earnings at a greater 
rate than women after the expansions, it could mean that their wages grew more rapidly than women’s. 
The growth in men’s wages, more than made up for the increase in post-EITC earnings for women due to 
the expansion. Furthermore, while states with higher mean EITC are associated with reducing the 
earnings gap for lower education levels and younger age groups, as compared to states with lower mean 
EITC, it could be due to the overall economy and policies of those states. States with higher average 
EITC tend to be the states with lower average wages. If the average wages for everyone is low, then an 
increase in the federal EITC, mostly received by women, could be increasing the earnings ratio. On the 
other hand, for the oldest age group and highest level of education-a market associated with the highest 
levels of wages and considerably high levels of employment rates-states with high average EITC are 
associated with remarkably high earnings gap of about 105%. In these states, the high wages push many 
individuals out of the EITC income eligibility and thus the EITC is not able to reduce the gap.
Rothstein’s paper illuminates the unintended consequences of EITC, where childless women are 
hurt by nature of the policy. The decrease in wages, without a sizeable EITC compensation, faced by the 
childless women could be nullifying the effect of the increase in post-EITC earnings of women with 
children. Since men are less sensitive to EITC changes, the resulting earnings gap remains the same.
Future research on this topic can include a longer period of study, covering the effects of some 
pre-and-post-OBRA93 EITC expansions. Moreover, a better estimate of weeks worked in a year and of 
the actual post-tax earnings, including a more sophisticated system of calculating a more accurate EITC, 
can improve the findings.
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Table A: Coefficients of models predicting some other key variables of all single women, 1990-1999
Total annual income Post-EITC earnings Predicted EITC
Coefficient
Estim ates
All women High school or 
less educated
Non-white All women High school or 
less educated
Non-white All women High school or 
less educated
Non-white
EITC/1000 302.40** 130.03 144.12 1198.28*** 1030.37*** 1029.26*** 906.93*** 906.36*** 897.61***
(110.16) (117.07) (162.91) (108.43) (116.23) (160.23) (9.37) (10.52) (12.58)
Non-W hite -306.16* -347.23* — -285.29* -327.19* — 9.16 13.19 —
(141.81) (153.35) (140.15) (151.61) (5.31) (7.08)
Years of 1503.20*** 754.15*** 1496.01*** 1479.73*** 741.00*** 1466.08*** -9 17*** -6.00*** -13.48***
Education (29.19) (30.99) (56.25) (28.93) (30.88) (55.36) (0.59) (0.96) (1.54)
Age 1071.22*** 761.64*** 735.05** 1001.22*** 738.03*** 717.51** -81 19*** -38.51*** -56.25***
(152.95) (153.52) (265.59) (152.50) (153.86) (263.61) (7.64) (10.12) (15.30)
Age Squared -6.78 -4.13 -2.09 -5.54 -3.87 -2.22 1.64*** 0.69** 0.93**
(3.87) (3.89) (6.91) (3.86) (3.89) (6.85) (0.17) (0.23) (0.36)
Age Cubed -0.09** -0.07* -0.09 -0.09** -0.07* -0.09 -0.011*** -0.004* -0.005
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
N 40,265 22,165 12,844 40,265 22,165 12,844 67,394 34,505 17,966
R2 0.21 0.13 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.10 0.86 0.88 0.84
Usual hours worked per week Log hourly wages
Coefficient
Estim ates
All women High school 
or less 
educated
Non-white All
women
(no
covariates)
All women High school 
or less 
educated
Non-white
EITC/1000 0.77*** 0.27* 0.09 -0.016*** - 0.001 - 0.0011 0.003
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Non-W hite 0.06 -0.25 — — -0.020*** -0.01 —
(0.09) (0.13) (0.005) (0.006)
Years of 0.35*** 0.32 0.39*** — 0.067*** 0 04*** 0.062***
Education (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age -0.20 -0.27 0.66** — 0.058*** 0.05*** 0.040***
(0.13) (0.17) (0.24) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Age 0.0155*** 0.02*** -0.01 — - 0 . 001* * * -0.0006*** 0.000
Squared (0.0033) (0.004) (0.01) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Age Cubed -0.0002*** -0.0002*** - 0.00001 — - 0.001 0.000002 0.003
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.0000019)
N 55,973 26,156 15,764 48,884 48,884 25,936 15,680
R2 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.25 0.15 0.26
Notes'. Data are from survey years 1990-1999 o f  the 
Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation 
Groups (CPS-MORG). The dependent variables are 
total annual income, post-EITC earnings, predicted 
EITC, usual hours worked per week, and log o f hourly 
wages. Total annual income is calculated using total 
hourly wages, usual hours worked per week and 40 for 
approximate number o f  weeks worked in a year. 
Predicted EITC is calculated using the total annual 
income, number o f  children and the tax year. Post- 
EITC earnings is Ihe sum ol'lotal annual income and 
predicted EITC. EITC' Woo is the maximum EITC 
benelils individuals can receive, based on Ihe number 
o f children, divided by 1000 for the ease o f  
interpretation. Non-white equals one if  the woman is o f  
a race other than white, zero otherwise. Each variable 
is calculated for three subgroups: all women in the 
sample, only high school and less than high school 
educated women, and only non-white women. All 
figures are in 2 0 1 0  dollars. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. “*p<0.05 **p 0.01 ***p 0.001”
Table B: Coefficients of models predicting the employment rate and the predicted EITC for all 
single heads of households by high EITC and low EITC states, 1990-1999
Variables Employment Rate Predicted EITC
H igh E IT C  sta te s Lo w  E IT C  sta te s H igh E ITC  sta te s Lo w  E IT C  sta te s
E IT C /1 0 0 0 0 .0 6 * * * -0 .0 7 * * * 7 3 3 .5 0 * * * -2 0 .1 2 * * *
(0 .0 0 4 ) (0 .0 0 3 ) (1 3 .2 1 ) (2 .5 6 )
N o n -w h ite -0 .0 9 * * * -0 .0 6 * * * 7 3 .7 0 * * * 0 89***
(0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (1 3 .6 0 ) (0 .2 5 )
E d u ca tio n  ye a rs 0 .0 3 * * * 0 .0 2 * * * -2 9  27*** -0 .4 4 * * *
(0 .0 0 0 4 ) (0 .0 0 0 4 ) (2 .4 5 ) (0 .0 4 )
age 0 .0 6 * * * -0 .0 3 * * * -3 3 .8 6 * 4 32***
(0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .0 0 2 ) (1 5 .3 9 ) (0 .2 1 )
A g e  sq u a re d -0 .0 0 1 * * * 0 .0 0 1 * * * 0.5 3 -0 .1 0 * * *
(0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .4 0 ) (0 .0 1 )
A g e  cu b e d 0 .0 0 0 0 0 2 * * -0 .0 0 0 0 1 * * * -0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 0 8 * * *
(0 .0 0 0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 5 ) (0 .0 0 3 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 5 )
N 1 4 7 4 3 6 1 3 3 2 8 1 1 92 76 1 3 3 2 8 1
R2 0 .2 0 9 0 .2 7 8 5 0 .6 9 4 6 0.0783
Ncties'. I)ata are from survey years 1990-1999 o f  Iho Current Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). Sample 
includes all single male and female, heads o f  household. The dependent variables are employment rate and predicted EITC. Employment rate 
equals one if  hours worked Iasi week are positive, zero otherwise. Predicted EITC is calculated using the total annual income, number o f  children
and Ihe lax year. EITC/1000 is Ihe maximum EITC benefits individuals can receive, based on the number o f children, divided by 1000 for the 
ease o f  interpretation. High EITC 'State is a dummy variable, where a state with an average EITC value o f  over $330 is assigned a value o f  one, 
and zero otherwise. All figures are in 2016 dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses. *-*p 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001”
